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Readin', 'Ritin','Rithmetic, and Responsibility:
Advocating for the Development of Controlled-
Choice Student-Assignment Plans
after Parents Involved
Sarah Sloan Wilson'
We assure ourselves that.., the fundamentals of education are to be
had in the three R's-readin' and 'ritin' and 'rithmetic. To this we
must add one more R and that is responsibility-responsibility to
the community .... 2
INTRODUCTION
C OMMENTING on the politics of student assignment, an intrepid school
board member once remarked, "[y]ou've got to really believe [sic]
that what you're doing is the right thing to do. Otherwise, it would be
intolerable. Student assignment is not pleasant."3 In Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle SchoolDistrict4 the Supreme Court of the United
i Bachelor of Arts in English, summa cum laude, 2003, University of Kentucky; Master's in
Teaching, 2004, City University; Juris Doctor to be awarded May 2009, University of Kentucky
College of Law. The subject of this Note was inspired by the author's teaching experience
prior to entering law school. The author wishes to thank Professor Robert G. Schwemm, whose
advice and insightful editorial comments on several early drafts proved invaluable. Also, the
author wishes to thank her husband and family for their support.
2 President Herbert Hoover, Address Commemorating the zoth Anniversary of the Boy
Scouts of America (Mar. 10, 193o), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22 545 .
President Hoover continued:
The Republic rests solely upon the willingness of everyone born into it
to bear his part of the duties and obligations of citizenship [which] is as
important as the ability to read and write-for that is the only patriotism
in peace. The idea that the Republic was created for the benefit of the
individual is a mockery that must be eradicated at the first dawn of
understanding.
Id.
3 Susan Leigh Flinspach & Karen E. Banks, MovingBeyondRace: Socioeconomic Diversity as
a Race-Neutral Approach to Desegregation in the Wake County Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION:
MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 261, 276 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2oo5).
4 Parents Involved in Cmry. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The title of
the opinion reflects the parties in the parallel Seattle case, in which the plaintiffs challenged
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States struck down both Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public
Schools' (JCPS') use of individual racial classifications. In the wake of this
decision, a school board member's job in a multi-racial school district seems
to be just that-intolerable.
The concept of a voluntary student-assignment plan-the means by
which a school district assigns students to particular schools-has continued
to fracture both the Supreme Court and the American public.5 For this
reason Parents Involved drew national attention, as "the drama and the anger
and the passion"' 6 with which the Justices debated demonstrated. Justice
Breyer reportedly rolled his eyes as Chief Justice Roberts announced the
plurality opinion.7 Later, while reading his dissenting opinion, Justice
a similar voluntary student-assignment plan that used race as a tie-breaker in high-school
admissions. Seattle, unlike Louisville, suspended its programs after the plaintiffs sued. Id.
at 2751.While the Seattle Public Schools' assignment plan is beyond the scope of this Note,
one distinction is instructive, namely, that the Seattle Public Schools were never de jure
segregated and, thus, were never subject to court-ordered desegregation. Id. at 2747.
5 Frederick Douglass spoke movingly on the subject of societal segregation in his Address
to the People of the United States, which he delivered at the Convention of Colored Men held in
Louisville, Kentucky on Sept. 25, 1883:
Though the colored man is no longer subject to be bought and sold,
he is still surrounded by an adverse sentiment which fetters all his
movements. In his downward course he meets with no resistance, but
his course upward is resented and resisted at every step of his progress..
.. The color line meets him everywhere .... In spite of all your religion
and laws he is a rejected man ... and yet he is asked to forget his color,
and forget that which everybody else remembers .... [H]e is sternly met
on the color line, and his claim to consideration in some way is disputed
on the ground of color.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 669, 673-74 (Philip S.
Foner ed., Lawrence Hill Books 1999). Compare Douglass' statements with Justice
Thomas' point of view:
"[R]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as
poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination." As
[student-assignment plans] demonstrate, every time the government
uses racial criteria to "bring the races together," someone gets excluded,
and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her
race .... This type of exclusion ... is precisely the sort of government
action that pits the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension,
and "provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race."
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2775 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) and Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815-16
(plurality opinion)).
6 Jeffrey Toobin, Toobin: School Ruling 'A Victory for Conservatives,' CNN, June 28, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2oo7/LAW/o6/28/toobin.ots/index.html.
7 Jennifer C. Kerr, Court Term Ends with Obvious Frustration, USA TODAY, June z8, 2007,
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Breyer stated pointedly, "[iut is not often in the law that so few have so
quickly changed so much."'  Finally, Justice Kennedy, in a reportedly
unusual step, read his concurrence from the bench.9
Parents Involved defied clear and easy answers, as Justice Kennedy's
concurrence evidenced:
The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to
solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. And if this is
a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the
duality of our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that
sometimes seems set against it.'0
In Parents Involved Justice Kennedy recognized that a school board may
assert a compelling educational interest in diversity, but he maintained that
the use of individual racial classifications must pass strict judicial scrutiny.
Thus, Justice Kennedy rejected the individual racial classifications at
issue, but he did not foreclose the possibility that a more carefully drafted
plan, even one that employed individual racial classifications, might pass
constitutional muster. Justice Kennedy, in contrast to some members of
the Court, has refused to maintain that the imposition of strict scrutiny in
such cases is automatically fatal." Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's opinion
hinted that school districts may consider race generally, and that such
measures may not demand strict scrutiny.
This Note will first review the Court's Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence and examine the Court's promise to provide an equal
educational opportunity to all public-school students. Second, the author
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/200 7-o6-28-3 3 5 7 4 zo8o 3 _x.htm.
8 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Limit Use of Race for School Integration Plans, NY "PMEs,
June 29, 2007, at Ai. See also Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan in Rulings
Favoring Business and Curbing Race Programs and Abortion, Some See an Overdue Correction;
Others Say the Justices Are Taking Nation "Backwards," USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, at A8 (quoting
Justice Breyer, who warned, "Yesterday, the citizens of this nation could look for guidance to
this court ... concerning desegregation. Today they cannot.").
9 Bill Mears, Divided Court Rejects School Diversity Plans, CNN, June z8, 2007, http://www.
cnn.cOm/2oo7/LAW/o6/28/scotus.racelindex.html.
1o Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy stated the same concern during oral arguments, if
perhaps a bit more informally:
[Tihe emphasis on the fact that everybody gets into a school, it seems to
me is misplaced, but the question is whether or not you can get into the
school that you really prefer. And that in some cases depends solely on
skin color. You know, it's like saying everybody can have a meal but only
people with separate skin can get the dessert.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School
Dist., 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-9o8), 2oo6 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 71.
i i Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2770 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
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will analyze the Parents Involved opinion. Accepting Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Parents Involved as persuasive authority,"2 the author
will recommend the adoption of a controlled-choice plan. Although this
Note will focus on the effect of Justice Kennedy's opinion on JCPS-the
"28th largest public school system in the United States," 13 -the author's
recommendations will apply with equal force to other southern districts.
C.S. Lewis wrote, "[flor every one pupil who needs to be guarded from
a weak excess of sensibility there are three who need to be awakened from
the slumber of cold vulgarity."' 4 Consequently, "[tihe task of the modern
educator is not to cut down jungles, but to irrigate deserts. The right defense
against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments."'" For teachers to
inspire such just sentiments in the classroom, school districts like JCPS,
which have historically clashed with the judicial system regarding the
courts' proper role in the desegregation process, must develop practical
solutions to promote integration. Controlled-choice student-assignment
plans will best meet these goals.
I. THE COURT'S PROMISE
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that, "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 16 More than fifty years ago in Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown I),'" the Court held that de jure racial segregation in
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court famously
announced that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." 8 The Court relied on sociological studies to support its statement
12 A concurring opinion is a "separate written opinion" that explains a concurrence, "a
vote cast by a judge in favor of the judgment reached, often on grounds differing from those
expressed in the opinion or opinions explaining the judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
309 (8th ed. 2004). In fact, as one court has noted, "[it has well been said that the views of
the individual judges are of no concern unless such views are adopted at least by a majority
of the court." State v. Goldstein, 93 So. 308, 314 (App. Ct. 1922). Although a concurrence is
not binding authority, this Note accepts Justice Kennedy's concurrence in so far as it provides
practical guidance for public school districts who, like JCPS, are anxious to design voluntary
student-assignment plans that will not get struck down by a future Court.
13 Brief for the Louisville Area of Commerce, Inc. and Louisville Metro Mayor Jerry
E. Abramson as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Oct. IO, 20o6) (No. 05-915), 2oo6 WL 2927086, at 5.
14 C.S. LEWIS, The Abolition of Man, in ThE COMPLETE C.S. LEWIS, SIGNATURE CLASSICS
465,472 (HarperSanFransisco 2002).
15 Id.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i, cl. 4.
17 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
18 Id. at 495. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500(1954) (holding on the same day
as Brown I that the Fifth Amendment similarly prohibited de jure racial segregation of schools
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that separating children on the basis of race "generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 19 Moreover, the Court strongly
promoted the benefits of an integrated education, insisting that "education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments...
[and] the very foundation of good citizenship."' 0 The Court reasoned that
a student's success later in life was in large part dependent upon his or her
early access to an equal educational opportunity.
Brown I did not address the question of how to formulate a remedy
to desegregate school systems that had operated under laws requiring or
allowing racial segregation prior to Brown L The practical solution to the
desegregation of such dual school systems was, thus, underwhelming. As
one commentator has noted, "Brown's promise combined very broad goals
with very narrow means."'" Although the 1954 Brown I decision explained
why segregated schools were inherently unequal, the remedial questions
of when integration would be achieved and who would be responsible for
it would continue to trouble the Court."2 In 1955 the Court delegated the
task of carrying out desegregation to local school authorities in Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown J). 23 The Court felt that school authorities,
rather than the Court, were best equipped to integrate schools, since "[flull
implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of
varied local school problems."2 4 Thus, local authorities were given broad
authority to realize the promises of Brown I by acting "with all deliberate
speed,"2 15 a phrase which was viewed by critics as limiting. 6 In other words,
"one could say that the promise of Brown was contradictory-to change
fundamentally the basic structure of Southern society and race relations
yet to do so in a way that would not seriously disturb white racists."2 7
Consequently, remedying de jure segregation in the public schools would
in the District of Columbia).
19 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
20 Id. at 493.
21 Gary Orfield, The Southern Dilemma: Losing Brown, Fearing Plessy, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 1, 4 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds.,
2005).
22 The remedial questions involved "how quickly desegregation must occur, what school
authority responses were and were not adequate to satisfy the remedial obligation; the scope
of judicial authority to formulate and enforce desegregation measures when those responses
were deemed inadequate; and under what circumstances school authorities had satisfied their
remedial obligations so that district courts should no longer retain jurisdiction." WILLIAM
COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 732 (12th ed. 2005).
23 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 0955).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 301.
26 See Orfield, supra note 2 1, at 4.
27 Id.
2008-2009]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
prove to be "most difficult" to achieve."8
A. Brown's Impact
Brown met with "massive resistance" 9 in many southern school districts
that, like JCPS, had operated dual systems prior to the ruling. Some districts
even blatantly refused to obey desegregation orders.30 In Louisville the
federal mandate to desegregate JCPS "stirred racial acrimony and sometimes
violence."3 1 Still, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-an Act which
"brought the power of the federal government squarely to bear on southern
schools" 3 -bolstered Brown's impact.33 In fact, the percentage of African-
American students studying at mostly Caucasian southern schools "jumped
to 33 percent, from 2 percent by the late 1960s." 34
The Court's decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s further
strengthened the move toward integration, and individual racial
classifications 35 became the district courts' remedy of choice. 36 In fact,
Justice Kennedy has stated that such measures "may be the only adequate
remedy after a judicial determination that a State or its instrumentality
28 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist., 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2795 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
29 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education, in
SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 29, 32 (John Charles Boger & Gary
Orfield eds., 2005).
30 Id.
31 Marcus Wohlsen, Hurt Fades, Hope Survives, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept.
4, 2005, at AI.
32 Orfield, supra note 21, at 5.
33 Associated Press, The March Toward Diversity in Nation's Schools, Now in Question,
Spans Generations, THE PITTSBURGH TIBUNE REVIEW, June 29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
12313057.
34 Id. (citing study by the Harvard University Civil Rights Project).
35 Districts that assign students to schools solely based on students' race employ
individual racial classifications. It is this "crude system" that is constitutionally permissible
"only" as a "last resort to achieve a compelling interest." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
36 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (holding that a freedom-
of-choice desegregation plan was constitutionally inadequate because it only preserved the
dual system) (citations omitted). After Green it became clear that the federal courts had an
affirmative duty to end state-sponsored segregation in the public schools when the school
authorities failed to act. Such a duty was evinced through desegregation orders, like the one
under which JCPS operated for over twenty-five years. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 402 U.S. I, 15, 23 (1971) (reaffirming a district court's role in the
desegregation process, namely, "to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation," but refusing to extend that role to "embrace all the problems of racial
prejudice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in
some schools").
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has violated the Equal Protection Clause."37 Although individual racial
classifications were viewed as necessary to remedy the legal wrong caused
by de jure segregation, the Court made it clear that such classifications would
be reviewed using strict scrutiny. In practice, judicial review of individual
racial classifications to remedy the de jure violation was forgiving. Still,
the Court emphasized that a district judge's authority was cabined by time
limitations and the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation.
In other words, individual racial classifications must be "limited in time
and limited to the wrong."38
In 1991 in Board of Education v. Dowell,39 the Court remanded to the
federal district court the question of whether the time had come to terminate
a desegregation order. The Court directed the lower court to inquire as to
whether the school district had acted "in good faith" 40 and whether "the
vestiges of de jure segregation had been eliminated as far as practicable."41
If the district had so acted, the Court continued, then the desegregation
order should be dissolved. 41 Moreover, in DowelP3 the Court required that
the use of individual racial classifications be targeted to remedy the legal
wrong-segregation by force of law. Thus, the Court did not sanction the
use of individual racial classifications to remedy the problem of societal,
or de facto, segregation.' In 1947 the Court in Milliken v. Bradle4 I had
dismissed the view that schools "could not be truly desegregated ... unless
the racial composition of the student body of each school substantially
reflected the racial composition of the population of the metropolitan area
as a whole."46 Justice Kennedy recognized this "fundamental" difference in
Parents Involved when he noted that "school districts that ha[ve] engaged in
de jure segregation ha[ve] an affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate;
37 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (quoting City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
38 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
39 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (199).
40 Id. at 249-50.
41 Id. at 250.
42 Id. Professor Chemerinsky faults the Court's reasoning: "Evidence indicated that
ending the desegregation order would likely result in dramatic resegregation. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court held that after Oklahoma City's racially dual school system had become
'unitary,' a federal court's desegregation order should end, even if the action could lead to
resegregation of the schools." Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 38.
43 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237.
44 De facto segregation occurs when "racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no
showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state authorities." Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971).
45 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
46 Id. at 740.
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those that were de facto segregated did not. 47
Although the Court has held that individual racial classifications are
sometimes permissible-indeed, that such classifications may be the
only apposite remedy in the face of de jure segregation-time constraints
and the de jure-de facto distinction remained to restrict a district judge's
authority.
B. The Problem of De Facto School Segregation
Just as the Court has historically struggled with its role in guiding the
desegregation process, it has similarly wrestled with its role after a district
has attained unitary status. A district court's role remains problematic,
given Brown I's promise of an equal education for all students. In the
South, the problem of de facto segregation is particularly daunting, for as
one scholar has explained, "[tihe South has a sense of tragedy, a sense of
its original sin of slavery, and the knowledge that progress is deeply mixed
with reverses."48 "A third of a century after the South's schools became
the least segregated in America, the region is leading a backward slide
toward renewed segregation [that is] under way more slowly in other parts
of the country."49 Newly re-segregated50 schools often appear on the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001's official list of failing schools."1 In fact,
in the years 1990 to 2000, public-school segregation between African-
American and Caucasian students5" increased in almost every southern
47 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2795 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
48 Orfield, supra note 21, at 2.
49 Id.
50 Judge Heyburn has faulted some courts' and commentators' use of the word
"resegregation":
The term "resegregation" is an improper and misleading description
of this phenomenon. Segregation is the conscious, deliberate act
of separating people by race. A return of some schools to an African-
American majority because of a certain racial demography could be
a vestige of the former segregation, but it is not an act of segregation
itself.
Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 FSupp.2d 358,371 n.z8 (W.D.Ky. 2000).
51 Orfield, supra note 21, at 3.
52 Of course, the problem of de facto segregation is not confined to two races, and "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class
theory'-that is, based upon difference between 'white' and Negro." COHEN, supra note 22, at
722 (quoting Hernandez v. Tx, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)).
[Vol. 97
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state. 3 Kentucky was one of those states s4 Conversely, data also showed
that JCPS, operating under a voluntary student-assignment plan at that
time, had "far lower levels of public school segregation than of residential
segregation.""5 Researchers have explained that these results suggest that
the district's plan was helping to produce relatively integrated schools. s6
The statistics showing southern schools' proclivity toward renewed
segregation suggest that local board members should be concerned about
the effects racial isolation will have on students' education. Researchers
have cited three main harms caused by racial isolation. These harms,
taken together, severely limit minority students' access to a public-
school education commensurate with that of their Caucasian peers. First,
students attending segregated schools have less access to the resources
and educational opportunities available to students attending integrated
or predominantly Caucasian schools. 7 Second, segregated schools prevent
minority students from taking advantage of social networks that provide
the contacts necessary for professional and academic advancement."
Finally, evidence shows that unless schools achieve a critical mass of
students from one particular racial group, minority students experience
"great discomfort and insecurity."5 9  In other words, minority students
achieve a type of "tokenism" 6 when racial isolation is allowed to thrive.
The effects of racial isolation separate minority students and prevent them
from benefiting from the equal education promised to them in Brown L
61
In Milliken v. Bradley6 the Court noted that the problems caused by racial
isolation threaten to permanently disenfranchise students: "[c]hildren
who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the larger
community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes.
which vary from the environment in which they must ultimately function
53 Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat
from School Desegregation in the South, 1990-2000, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH
TURN BACK? 5 1, 53 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
54 See id. at 55 fig. 2.1.
55 Id. at 6o; see id. at 61 fig. 2.5.
56 Id. at 62.
57 Jacinta S. Ma & Michal Kurlaender, The Future of Race-Conscious Policies in K-12 Public
Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 249 (John Charles Boger &
Gary Orfield eds., zoo5).
58 Id.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 248-49.
61 The Supreme Court has declined to hold that education is a fundamental right under
the Equal Protection Clause. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
However, education has been recognized as a vital part of American democracy, and as Brown
I recognized, since states have "undertaken to provide" a public education, this right "must be
made available to all on equal terms." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
62 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1967).
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and compete."63 Although in Milliken the Court dealt with racial isolation
arising from de jure segregation, a similar harm results from racial isolation
stemming from de facto segregation.
The Court has distinguished between de jure and de facto segregation.
64
Thus, even though the harm-racial isolation-may be the same, the
legal remedy clearly is not. However, Justice Kennedy has noted that the
Court's distinction is tenuous. From the victim's perspective, the injury
"can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based on race identity
stems from bias masked deep within the social order as when it is imposed
by law."' 65 Moreover, law and society often coalesce. Laws, after all, often
"arise from a culture and vice versa ... [and] [n]either can assign to the
other all responsibility for persisting injustices."66 In the de facto context,
board members and school officials-not the courts-will be responsible
for ensuring that public schools remain integrated in the face of rising racial
isolation.
II. MEREDITH V. JCPS
Once courts declared that systems like JCPS were no longer dual, Equal
Protection Clause challenges to the use of individual racial classifications
became more prominent. 67 The tables had been turned-now plaintiffs
sued to prevent school districts from voluntarily using individual racial
classifications. Such a shift has been evidenced at both the K-12 and
university level.
In the university context, the Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger68
cautioned that while the University of Michigan's law school did have
a compelling interest in maintaining a diverse student body, the narrow
tailoring analysis remained rigorous. The plan in Grutter passed strict
scrutiny, although Justice Kennedy dissented on the grounds that the plan
was not narrowly tailored. 69 The same day the Court extended Grutter's
diversity holding to the undergraduate level in Gratz v. Bollinger.7" The
Gratz plan itself, however, was struck down as an unconstitutional quota.7
63 Id. at 287.
64 See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
65 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2795 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
66 Id.
67 See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[AllI racial classifications ... must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
68 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
69 Id. at 388-89.
70 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
71 See id.
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Here, Justice Kennedy joined the majority.72 Thus, although the Court
upheld a law school's use of individual racial classifications in Grutter-
and reaffirmed the diversity interest in Gratz-the tenor of the two cases
revealed the rigor with which the Court (particularly, Justic Kennedy)
would continue to review the use of individual racial classifications. Taken
together, Grutter and Gratz suggest that the use of racial classifications
warrants "a broader assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to
achieve racial balance."
7 3
A. JCPS's Voluntary Student-Assignment Plan
Like many southern school districts, JCPS74 had a history of de jure
racial segregation. In 1975, under the Sixth Circuit's direction, the district
court ordered JCPS to desegregate . 7 Essentially, the court mandated the
use of racial guidelines to achieve desegregation. A plan to merge the
African-American and Caucasian school systems was later adopted. This
plan, similar to the Swann plan, required bussing.76 In 1984, the district
redrew its attendance lines for middle and high schools and adjusted the
original 1975 racial guidelines. In 1991, the district again made "significant
modifications" 77 to the plan to increase stability for students and to allow
parents more choice in school selection. The revised plan assigned
students to their chosen school "subject to building/program capacity,
racial guidelines, and in some instances admissions criteria."78 This plan
was reviewed again in 1996, at which time the board changed the racial
guidelines: each school would be required to maintain a balanced student
body that included no less than 15 percent and no greater than 50 percent
72 Id.
73 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
74 Louisville has had an interesting geographic history. For example, it has been dubbed
"the gateway from the North to the South," and the "northernmost Southern city and
southernmost Northern city in the United States." Brief for the Louisville Area of Commerce,
supra note 13, at 3-4 (internal quotations omitted). As such, Louisville has suffered from racial
segregation in spite of its position as a Union stronghold during the Civil War. Louisville
also experienced "unrest in the 196os over civil rights and in the 1970s over busing." Id. at
4 (quoting Ellen R. Stapleton, Police Shooting Aggravates Racial Tensions in Ky., ThE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2oo4/ol/16/police-
shooting-aggravates-racial-tensions-inky/).
75 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749 (plurality opinion).
76 See generally Suzy Post, Ruling Is 'a Massive Step Backwards,' COURIER-JOuRNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), June 29, 2007, at AI. Written by the only surviving plaintiff from the original
1974 desegregation lawsuit, Post discusses the effect of segregation on the allocation of school
resources as well as the community's reaction to the desegregation plan.
77 Joint Appendix at 90, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007), 2006 WL 2568816.
78 Id.
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African-American students (15-50 percent racial guidelines).79
In 1998, a group of plaintiffs challenged the district's use of the 15-
50 percent racial guidelines in assigning students to Central High Magnet
Career Academy (Central). The case involved private litigants suing to
remove a desegregation degree "against the will of a school board."' As
noted by presiding U.S. District Judge John G. Heyburn, the posture of
the case was remarkable: "Usually, it is the school board trying to shed its
obligations under a desegregation order .... This case manifests.., the
confusion and frustration attending our nation's long project of remedying
the effects of racial segregation. 8 1  In 2000, Judge Heyburn dissolved
the 1975 desegregation decree, holding that both the Dowell criteria for
dissolving a desegregation decree had been met."2 Throughout the
opinion, Judge Heyburn was careful to distinguish his role in the process
as "stak[ing] out the constitutional parameters within which the Board is
free to exercise its discretion-wisely, foolishly, cautiously, bravely, astutely,
as the case may be." 83 He rejected the implication that his ruling would
irreparably harm the community or the quality of education in JCPS, writing
that "[t]his suggestion makes too much of this moment and gives too little
credit to those who care about education in this community.", After the
ruling, JCPS officially became a unitary, or integrated, school system.
In dissolving the decree, Judge Heyburn maintained that the district
could continue to use race in assigning students; however, he cautioned
that any use of race must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest, since the district's 15-50 percent racial guidelines
were no longer "shielded from normal constitutional scrutiny"8 by the
order. Thus, although the district was ordered immediately to stop using
race to assign students "in an unconstitutional manner" 6 to Central, the
ruling compelled no change vis-i-vis JCPS's regular schools. In response,
the board approved the voluntary school-assignment plan at issue in Parents
Involved. The plan, which grouped elementary schools into clusters "to
79 Id. at 9o-93.
8o Hampton v. Jefferson County. Bd. of Educ., 1o2 E Supp. 2d 358, 359 (WD. Ky. 2000).
8I Id.
82 Id. at 36o. Judge Heyburn recognized the achievement gap problem:
For understandable reasons, there is great concern about the achievement
gap nationwide .... It seems likely that numerous external factors-
including high poverty incidence, lower levels of parental education,
higher incidence of families without two active parents, frequent moves,
and less access to quality pre-school education-produce the disparity.
Id. at 365-66.
83 Id. at 376.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 377.
86 Id. at 381.
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facilitate integration,""7 maintained the 15-50 percent racial guidelines.
Moreover, students would be assigned to "the school which serves the area
in which they reside '8 unless "the school ha[d] reached building/program
capacity and/or the extremes of the racial guidelines. '8 9 The constitutional
problem, which the Supreme Court would squarely address in Parents
Involved, arose where two otherwise similarly situated students--one
Caucasian and one African American-sought assignment at a school that
had reached the extremes of the 15-50 percent racial guidelines. Which
student would be assigned to the school of his or her choice, and, perhaps
more importantly, why and how?
JCPS continued to use its student-assignment plan to assign students
to elementary and middle schools, and this choice met with community-
wide approval according to a 2001 survey.9 However, it was not long before
JCPS was again faced with a challenge to its student-assignment plan-this
time the plaintiffs targeted the district's use of race to assign students to
its "regular schools." 91 In 2002, David McFarland filed a lawsuit claiming
that his two sons were prevented from enrolling in the schools of their
choice because they were Caucasian. This lawsuit was later joined by other
plaintiffs, including Crystal Meredith, who claimed her son was subject
to similar allegedly unconstitutional treatment. Meredith's request for
an injunction was denied by Judge Heyburn. In 2004, Judge Heyburn
held that the district had a compelling interest in increasing diversity and
that the plan's use of race in its voluntary student-assignment plan was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause.9 This
decision was subsequently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.93 On these facts,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether
JCPS's voluntary student-assignment plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause.'
87 Joint Appendix, at 98, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.,
2738 (2007), 2oo6 WL 25 68816.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 In 2001 more than 8o percent of parents approved of the JCPS plan. See Chris Kenning,
5-4 RulingLimits Use of Race by Distict, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 29, 2007 at K I.
The author questions whether community support for any student-assignment plan matters.
Given the public's resistance to integration, particularly bussing in the late 197os, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text, community support for a voluntary student-assignment plan
is a dubious mark of distinction at best. At worst, public support for a plan should not be
viewed as a referendum on a district's progress (or lack thereof) toward achieving diverse
student bodies.
91 Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 ESupp.2d 358, 381 (W.D. Ky. zooo).
92 McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schs., 330 F.Supp.2d 834, 837 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
93 McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schs., 416 F3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (percuriam).
94 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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A full discussion of each Parents Involvedopinion is beyond the scope of
this Note; however, a few words on each will be instructive. In the plurality
opinion, four justices recognized two compelling interests-remedying
the effects of past de jure discrimination and achieving diversity in higher
education-but struck the Louisville plan down after concluding that
neither interest was present on the facts.95 Justice Thomas concurred.'
The four dissenting justices, who disagreed in almost every way with the
plurality, recognized the diversity interest at the K-12 level. In two separate
dissents, the justices minimized the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation and concluded that the individual racial classifications at
issue were constitutional. 97
95 Id. at 2753.
96 Justice Thomas writes movingly:
Contrary to the dissent's arguments, resegregation is not occurring in
Seattle or Louisville; these school boards have no present interest in
remedying past segregation; and these race-based student-assignment
programs do not serve any compelling state interest. Accordingly, the
plans are unconstitutional. Disfavoring a colorblind interpretation of the
Constitution, the dissent would give school boards a free hand to make
decisions on the basis of race .... And foreshadowing today's dissent,
the segregationists most heavily relied upon judicial precedent. The
similarities between the dissent's arguments and the segregationists'
arguments do not stop there. Like the dissent, the segregationists
repeatedly cautioned the Court to consider practicalities and not to
embrace too theoretical a view of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
just as the dissent argues that the need for these programs will lessen
over time, the segregationists claimed that reliance on segregation was
lessening and might eventually end. What was wrong in 1954 cannot be
right today.
Id. at 2768, 2785-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
97 Justice Breyer's dissent is particularly strongly worded:
[Tihe last halfcentury has witnessed great strides toward racial equality,
but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate the
plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality's
position, I fear, would break that promise. This is a decision that the
Court and the Nation will come to regret.
Id. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, who joined Justice Breyer's dissent
"in its entirety," wrote separately to discuss the "cruel irony" in Chief Justice Roberts'
reliance on Brown:
The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of [Chief Justice
Roberts'] opinion states: "Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin."
This sentence reminds me of Anatole France's observation: "[Tlhe
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." The Chief Justice
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Thus, it was Justice Kennedy who ultimately cast the deciding vote to
strike down Louisville's 15-50 percent racial guidelines. Justice Kennedy's
concurrence provides school boards with three useful propositions. First,
the diversity interest is compelling as applied to the public-school setting.
Second, the strict scrutiny test does not completely foreclose a school
district from using race to assign students, provided that the diversity
interest is supported by a carefully researched, supported, and documented
plan. Third, race-conscious measures do not demand strict scrutiny.
Some tension between the Court's strict-scrutiny precedent and the
rising problem of racial isolation in public schools was evident in Justice
Kennedy's opinion:
The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people
of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the
freedom of all. UCPS] seek[s] to teach that principle by having classrooms
that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the
[district] consider[s] these plans to be necessary should remind us our
highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled. But the solutions mandated by these
school districts must themselves be lawful. To make race matter now so
that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to
overcome.
98
Perhaps due in part to this tension, some critics have claimed that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence "'actually creates more confusion,"' 99 and that his
opinion makes uncertain "'when and how much race can be used."' °
While Justice Kennedy thus neatly summarized the importance of
diversity in public schools, the task of complying with his opinion will
fall to local board members, who must now determine how to maintain
diverse schools without running afoul of Parents Involved. Before looking
for a practical solution to student assignment, board members must first
understand the constitutional parameters set forth in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. Most importantly, board members must recognize the
constitutional problems inherent in the JCPS plan.
fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered;
indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling
to attend black schools. In this and other ways, the Chief Justice rewrites
the history of one of this Court's most important decisions.
Id. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
98 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
99 Andrew Wolfson, Some Find 'Sunshine' Amid Rain, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
June 29, 2007, at K6 (quoting Hans Bader of the Competitive Enterprise Institute).
too Id.
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B. No Easy Solution
Public schools have a compelling interest in encouraging a diverse
student body. However, according to Justice Kennedy's concurrence, this
interest is not informed by the Court's recent affirmative action decisions,
Gratz and Grutter.'10 In fact, Justice Kennedy distinguished Gratz and
Grutter as being supported by First Amendment interests not present at
the public-school level. 02 While Grutter and Gratz may not inform the
diversity interest at the public-school level, Justice Kennedy insisted that a
compelling interest did exist nonetheless.0 3 Specifically, he suggested that
if the problem of racial isolation is a real threat, public-school officials may
combat it by encouraging a diverse student body. 104 He stated that public
schools have an interest in avoiding racial isolation, because public schools
"do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole."'' 10 In other words,
in Justice Kennedy's interpretation, the problems caused by racial isolation
posed a substantial threat to Brown I's promise of an equal educational
opportunity.
Justice Kennedy questioned the plurality's dismissal of the public
schools' legitimate interest in achieving an equal educational opportunity
for all students: 1°6
Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity.
Yet ourtradition is to go beyond the recent achievements, however significant,
and to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that remain. This is
especially true when we seek assurance that the opportunity is not denied
on account of race. The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the
reality is that too often it does.'
Moreover, Justice Kennedy worried that the plurality's stance might be
interpreted to bar school officials from combating racial isolation, a reading
which, in his opinion, would be "profoundly mistaken."' 18 He even made
his disagreement with the plurality's confident tone explicit when he
questioned the plurality's belief that "'[tihe way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." ' 1 9 The
IO Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
io2 Id. at 2794.
103 Id. at 2789.
104 Id. at 2797.
105 Id.
io6 Id. at 2791.
107 Id.
io8 Id.
io9 Id. (quoting plurality opinion).
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dangers posed by racial isolation ° "deflied] so easy a solution. '
C. Problems with the Plan
While JCPS did assert a compelling educational interest in diversity,
the district's use of individual racial classifications failed to pass strict
scrutiny.112 Broadly speaking, Justice Kennedy was unable to establish
a "thorough understanding""' of how the JCPS plan worked. His
concurrence reaffirmed that a district that desires to use race in its voluntary
student-assignment plan must support its plan with evidence of specific
and documented research that supports a quantifiable need to use race. In
addition, a district's adoption of a plan must be the result of a meticulous
drafting process. Finally, in its implementation a district must remain both
clear and impartial. The JCPS plan failed on all three levels.
The district did not provide the Court with clear statistical evidence to
support the necessity of its use of individual racial classifications. Justice
Kennedy sought to elicit proof of the district's quantifiable need to use
the classifications during oral arguments. In response, the district offered
two pieces of evidence to support its use of individual racial classifications:
hypothetical scenarios and community surveys that demonstrated parental
support for the plan. According to the district, the hypothetical scenarios
showed "substantial resegregation"'1 4 absent the racial classifications.
However, when requested to produce the scenarios, or research supporting
their validity, JCPS was forced to admit that the scenarios were "not in the
record.""'  The community surveys were also of questionable evidentiary
worth, since it was not clear whether the definition of "community" meant
parents whose children were actually enrolled in JCPS's public schools ."
6
In addition to a paucity of statistical evidence, the district failed to
investigate race-neutral alternatives before adopting the individual racial
classifications at issue. Here Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality's
discussion of workable race-neutral alternatives. Thus, a majority of the
Court agreed that the district's failure to investigate race-neutral means
proved fatal to JCPS's case. Justice Kennedy also noted the fact that
1 io See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
i i Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
112 See id. at 2789. Compare with Justice Thomas' contemplation of strict scrutiny: race-
based government decision making "is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest. This exacting scrutiny 'has proven automatically fatal' in most
cases." Id. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
113 Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
114 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2oo7) (No. 05-915), 2oo6 US TRANS LEXIS 72.
115 Id. at 40.
i 16 See id. at 43-44; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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only a limited number of student assignments depended on the racial
classifications, a fact which he believed suggested that the plan was not
necessary."7 In fact, after being informed that race was the "dispositive
factor" "I in no more than 2-to-3 percent of students' applications during
oral arguments, Justice Kennedy simply asked, "why do[es] [the district]
need it?"' 1 9
The plan must also be precisely written. In briefing and arguing the
case, the district failed to "make clear ... who ma[de] the decisions; what
if any oversight [wa]s employed; the precise circumstances in which an
assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of race; or how it
[wa]s determined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected
to a given race-based decision."'' 0 Kennedy noted "the blanket mandate
that '[sichools shall work cooperatively with each other and with central
office to ensure that enrollment at all schools [in question] [are] within
the racial guidelines annually and to encourage that the enrollment at all
schools progresses toward the midpoint of the guidelines'.'' as further
evidence of the sprawling nature of the plan. Such language, Kennedy
wrote, is too "broad and imprecise"'2 2 to withstand strict scrutiny. The
plan did not make clear how assignments were made. It failed to provide
enough guidance for school administrators to assign individual students to
particular schools, and it neglected to advise administrators on how race
should be employed in that determination.
Third, and perhaps most damaging for the district, the facts of the case
did not support the conclusion that the district fairly implemented the
plan. For example, Joshua McDonald, Crystal Meredith's son, was denied
the requested transfer for his kindergarten enrollment even though JCPS
maintained, and the student-assignment plan similarly stated, that the
guidelines did not apply to kindergarteners.2 3 Justice Kennedy expressed
frustration with what he felt was the district's failure to specifically
117 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
i18 Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-915), 2oo6 US TRANS LEXIS 72.
1i9 Id.
i2o Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
121 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 96-97, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), 2oo6 WL 2568816) (emphasis added).
122 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
123 Id. at 2789 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 4). See also Joint Appendix at 97, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), 2oo6WL 2568816 ("All
elementary students (K- 5 ) shall be assigned to the school which serves the area in which they
reside... unless the school has reached building/program capacity and/or the extremes of the
racial guidelines.).
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chronicle just how the decision to deny Joshua McDonald his requested
kindergarten transfer was made." 4 Thus, according to Justice Kennedy,
one of the chief ills of JCPS's case was its failure to make clear to the
Court just how and why Joshua's request was denied. As a result of ad
hoc implementation, the district was unable to sustain its burden to show
that the racial classifications at issue were narrowly tailored to the district's
compelling interest in achieving diversity.'
Notably, Justice Kennedy did not foreclose the use of race in voluntary
student-assignment plans. While his concurrence opined that school
districts like JCPS should work toward diversity and resist racial isolation
in schools, his approach maintained that the implementation of such noble
goals must pass strict judicial scrutiny. Justice Kennedy condemned
the JCPS plan in part because it provided for "different treatment"2 6 of
individual students solely on the basis of race. Such methods "tell[] each
student he or she is to be defined by race."' 7 This individual classification
offended the Equal Protection Clause, and was thus permissible in only the
most "extraordinary"'2 8 of circumstances not present on the facts. Thus,
post-Parents Involved, courts will rigorously scrutinize voluntary student-
assignment plans that classify students by race. Consequently, a district
must unremittingly research, draft, and implement a voluntary student-
assignment plan that uses race as a factor, or risk a Parents Involved result.
Measures that consider race generally are different. Under Justice
Kennedy's approach, such measures may not be subjected to strict scrutiny,
but just when and how much a district can employ such measures is not
clear.2 9 Justice Kennedy did not illustrate how such measures might be
incorporated into an actual student-assignment plan. He stated that districts
may take race into account when choosing where to build new schools,
drawing attendance zones, allocating resources, recruiting students and
faculty, and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics. Such
measures, of course, are only permissible if they do not explicitly assign
children based on their race. 30 Of course, the line between permissible
and non-permissible use of race is a thin one; thus, board members must
carefully scrutinize any use of race post-Parents Involved.
124 See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
125 See id. at 2789.
126 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2796.
129 See id. at 2796-97.
130 See id. at 2792.
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D. Moving Forward in the Spirit of Justice Kennedy's Opinion
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved, the case
was remanded to Judge Heyburn in Louisville, Kentucky. School officials
spoke optimistically about the ruling, refusing to view it as "a gloom-and-
doom day" for the district."' Just one day after the Court filed its ruling,
Louisville officials made it clear that Justice Kennedy's concurrence would
guide them as they sought to comply with the decision, stating confidently
that "race-conscious measures can be used by a school district."'32
As for immediate compliance with the decision, JCPS informed its
principals that they may no longer take race into account when deciding
whether to accept or deny entrance to students.'33 The district continued to
deny entrance to particular students based on other factors, such as space or
a student's grades, attendance, or behavior.' 3 In a hearing Judge Heyburn
approved each of these changes and stated that he would review allegations
that the district had violated the Supreme Court's decision on a "case-by-
case basis."'135  Judge Heyburn also interpreted the Court's decision to
allow the district to have time to reformulate a revised student-assignment
plan. 136 The district then began to develop a revised student-assignment
plan, which will be implemented for the 2009-2010 school year.'37
The Court's decision did force the district to halt one other practice,
namely the district's use of different attendance zones for African-American
and Caucasian students at three traditional magnet elementary schools.
In August 2007, Judge Heyburn, holding that JCPS's use of separate
attendance zone for African-American and Caucasian magnet students was
impermissible in light of Parents Involved, ordered the district to redraw its
attendance zones for the 2008-2009 year.
138
JCPS later announced its six guiding principles: diversity, quality, choice,
131 Nancy C. Rodriguez, Plaintiffs:ActNow: District: Not Yet, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), June 29, 2007, at KI.
132 Id.
133 See Chris Kenning, School Race Guidelines Jettisoned, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), July 20, 2007, at AI.
134 Id. In this article, the author notes that some members of the community are
suspicious of whether "school officials are really denying transfers because they have no room,
or because they are 'still playing the race game."' The district denies that officials are using
race, pointing to the fact that many schools are now outside the previous racial guidelines. Id.
135 Chris Kenning, Schools' Course Since Race Ruling OK'd, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Aug. 3, 2007, at As.
136 See Mem. Op. & Order, Meredith v. Jefferson Bd. of Educ., No. 3:02-CV-62o-H, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64473, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 30, 2007).
137 Kenning, supra note 133.
138 Meredith v. Jefferson Bd. of Educ., No. 3 :02-CV-62o-H, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64473, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 30, 2007). See also Chris Kenning, Separate Attendance Zones Voided,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 29, 2007, at At.
[Vol. 97
CONTROLLED-CHOICE
predictability, stability, and equity.'39 The specifics of the actual student-
assignment plan, however, "must still be worked out."'" The board has
stated that it plans to compare the plans used by various other districts
to achieve a long-term solution. 141 An interim plan that "uses geography
to ensure that elementary schools draw 15 percent to 50 percent of their
enrollment from areas with minority populations of at least 45 percent"'
14
was adopted for the 2008-2009 school year. The plan, which would only
apply to students either new to the district or who have moved, was almost
immediately challenged as violating Parents Involved, but Judge Heyburn
rejected the challenge.
143
As for a permanent solution, officials have proposed two plans to fulfill
the district's diversity goals. The first plan draws contiguous attendance
lines, while the second relies on non-contiguous lines. Both plans maintain
the 15-50 percent guidelines; however, these guidelines are no longer
based solely on race. In addition to race, the guidelines seek to achieve
diversity by reviewing income and educational attainment. The district
plans to designate two geographical areas (Area A and Area B) and assign 15
percent to 50 percent of all students at each school from Area A, which will
be composed of students and families who fall below the county's median
educational attainment and median household income. In addition, Area A's
population will be composed of above 47.9 percent minorities, the district
having broadened its definition of minority to include all minorities-not
just African Americans. I'" The board recently approved the contiguous
plan for JCPS' elementary schools, and this plan will be implemented in
2009.145
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since a unitary school system can no longer rely on the Court's more
accommodating de jure segregation jurisprudence, schools like JCPS find
139 Fax from Sheldon Berman, Superintendent, Jefferson County Public Schs., to all
Jefferson County Public Sch. Elementary Principals (Sept. 8, 2oo8) (on file with author).
14o Antoinette Konz, Schools Adopt Guidelines for Assignment Plan, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 11, 2007, at AI.
141 Id.
142 Antoinette Konz, Judge Refuses to Reject School Integration Plan, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 12, 2008, at BI.
143 Id. Ted Gordon, the plaintiffs' attorney in Parents Involved, filed a motion asking
Judge Heyburn to review the interim plan. Id. Mr. Gordon's motion was denied because, in
the words of Judge Heyburn, the plan is not "a obvious, clear-cut violation" of Parents Involved.
Id.
144 Amanda Webb, JCPS Narrows Student-Assignment Options, Bus. FIRST LOUISVILLE, Jan.
28, 2008, http:/llouisvilile.bizjournals.com/louisville/stories/2oo8/o1/28/daily6.html?page=2.
145 Antoinette Konz, School Board OKs Assignment Plan: Change to Begin in Fall Of 2009,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 29, 2004, at AI.
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themselves in an "intolerable"'146 position. When faced with evidence of
growing racial isolation, board members must (a) seek solutions that realize
Brown I's promise of an equal education, and (b) combat racial isolation
without classifying students solely based on their race. Parts I and II of
this Note focused on the legal definition of segregation and desegregation,
which the Supreme Court has limited to intentional state-sponsored
behavior.147 Given the evidence of racial isolation discussed in Part 1,148
JCPS students will attend schools that enroll a disproportionate number
of any one racial group unless board members act decisively. Moreover,
such de facto segregation will not be legally recognized as harmful after
Parents Involved. This reality is troubling, especially considering Brown I's
emphasis on the harm that occurs when students are separated on the basis
of race. De facto segregated students suffer from "feeling[s] of inferiority"
149
whether the district intended to separate them or not.5 0 The fact that the
Court has barred districts from assigning students based solely on their race
after unitary status has been declared should not dissuade board members
from achieving an equal and excellent education for all students.
Public-school board members faced with evidence of increased racial
isolation in their district may choose to meet this threat by implementing a
controlled-choice plan. Acontrolled-choice plan relies on "simultaneous []"'i
implementation of three components: personal choice, diversity, and school
improvement.' Each component must be present for the plan to succeed.
Thus, the plan will fail if board members focus on choice and diversity to
the exclusion of school improvement. In addition, all three components
must be implemented at the same time: focusing on diversity or choice
before school improvement will not achieve the benefits of a controlled-
choice plan.'53
A. Reflections on Responsibility
Before examining the specifics of a controlled-choice plan, it should
be noted that the importance of integration at the primary and secondary
levels cannot be overstated. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 63
146 Flinspach & Banks, supra note 3, at 276.
147 See generally supra notes 16-145 and accompanying text.
148 See generally supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
149 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
15o John A. Powell, A New Theory of Integrated Education, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION:
MUST THE SOUTH TORN BACK? 282 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
151 CHARLES V. WILLIE, RALPH EDWARDS, & MICHAEL ALVES, STUDENT DIVERSITY, CHOICE,
AND STUDENT IMPROVEMENT 23 (2002).
152 Id. at 22.
153 Id. at 23.
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percent of Americans have not obtained a college degree.'- 4 Thus, for the
majority of Americans, educational experiences end at the primary and
secondary level. Research suggests that while adults "may find it difficult
to abandon racial stereotypes already formed . . .children who interact
regularly with persons of other races are less likely to fall into patterns of
stereotypical thinking."' -" Thus, whether students will attend college or
not, their beliefs about race are formed early, and for this reason diversity is
a lesson "best taught early in life." ' 6
The fight over the importance of affirmative action at the university
level is, for this reason, misplaced. Integration at the primary and secondary
level is fundamental for the development of more diverse post-secondary
student bodies, because universities and colleges "rely on lower-level
schools to prepare students of all races and ethnic backgrounds for the
demands of higher education." ' 7 If "race-conscious admission policies in
colleges and universities are to become obsolete, local [board members]
should be granted the latitude to promote student diversity in elementary
and secondary schools now."'58  Promoting diversity at the elementary
and secondary level will result in a "broader array of applicants who are
equipped to face the demands of higher education."' 15 9
In addition, public-school board members have a responsibility to
ensure that students do not attend de facto segregated schools. In the
words of John Dewey, a nineteenth-century American philosopher and
educator, public schools should "balance the various elements in the social
environment, and ... see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to
escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and
... come into living contact with a broader environment."'160 Since Justice
Kennedy eschewed the use of individual racial classifications except as
a "last resort,"'161 board members must reconcile this view with the real
problems of administering, financing, and implementing any student-
assignment plan. Here, board members should focus on the concept of
154 U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2003 1 (June
2004), available at www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/pzo-55o.pdf.
155 Brief for The American Psychological Ass'n. & the Washington State Psychological
Ass'n. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle
School Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2oo6) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2oo6 WL 2927084.
156 BriefofAmerican Council on Education and 19Other Higher Education Organizations
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School
Dist., 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Oct. 10, 2oo6) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2oo6 WL 2882689.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 17.
159 Id. at 17-I8.
i6o Powell, supra note i5o, at 283 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 20
(1916)).
161 Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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controlled choice. By developing a controlled-choice plan, a district
can confidently implement a plan without fear of either increased racial
isolation or heightened judicial scrutiny.
B. Controlled Choice
"[W]hat the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must
the community want for all its children."' 161 Personal choice is essential to
a district's goal of providing an equal and excellent education to each of its
students. Due in part to the problem of housing segregation in America,
a district that eschews choice in favor of a neighborhood school system
will not be able to provide such benefits to its students, because de facto
school segregation is magnified in those districts that use a location-based
assignment plan.
When students have no choice but to attend their neighborhood's school,
two problems emerge. First, neighborhood schools are more likely to be de
facto segregated, because the statistical data demonstrates that America's
neighborhoods are still highly segregated. For example, "[tihe average white
person in metropolitan American lives in a neighborhood that is 80 percent
white and only 7 percent black," while "[a] typical black individual lives
in a neighborhood that is only 33 percent white and as much as 51 percent
black."' 163 The effect of such housing segregation on schools is startling. In
2002-2003, 71 percent of all African-American public-school students and
73 percent of Latino public-school students attended high-poverty schools,
in contrast to the mere 28 percent of Caucasian public-school students who
attended such schools 64 In Louisville, the national trend is even more
concentrated: "African-Americans constitute less than 19 percent of the
metropolitan area's population, but more than 50 percent of the population
in five council districts and less than 5 percent in five other districts."
' 6
1
While a more extensive discussion of the effect of housing segregation on
public-school segregation is beyond the scope of this Note,1 66 the import
162 WILLIE ETAL., supra note 15i, at 21 (citing John Dewey, 19oo).
163 Brief for Housing Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations in Support of
Respondents as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v.
Seattle School Dist., 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Oct. io, 2oo6) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2oo6 WL 2927078.
164 Id. at 5.
i65 Id. at 7 (citing METRO Hous. COAL., STATE OF METROPOLITAN HoUsING REPORT 9
(2005)).
166 For an excellent discussion of the intersection between housing patterns and school
integration, see generally Brief for Housing Scholars and Research and Advocacy Organizations,
supra note 163 (discussing "steering," where real estate agents direct minority homebuyers to
predominantly minority neighborhoods, and vice versa, and citing the following statement by
an agent: "[area] is different from here .... I'm not allowed to steer you, but there are some
areas that you wouldn't want to live in"). See also BRICK By BRICK: A CIVIL RIGHTS STORY
(Kavanagh Productions 2007), which documents the fallout from United States v. Yonkers, a case
[Wol. 97
CONTROLLED-CHOICE
of the statistical evidence suggests that "meaningful integration" 167 of the
public schools is unlikely to occur under a neighborhood school system.
Second, neighborhood schools are, at best, a temporary fix, because the
racial and socio-economic composition of each neighborhood is in constant
flux. It is not impossible to create a diverse school using a neighborhood
system. However, it is highly unlikely. Even the most diverse neighborhood
could become de facto segregated in a short period of time. In other
words, there is no guarantee that shifting economic or social conditions
will not prompt a change in the racial or socio-economic structure of even
the most diverse of neighborhoods. For example, between March 1999
and March 2000 about 43.4 million Americans moved, and over one-half
of these moves were intra-county moves. 68 Consequently, a district that
implements a neighborhood school plan has two options: to change its plan
constantly to meet the needs of shifting neighborhoods, or to do nothing
and risk de facto segregated schools. Based on the current housing patterns
in America, 169 this risk is likely to become (if it is not already) a reality in
most districts. Personal choice offers a sensible and reliable solution to
this problem: students' choice rather than their physical location will guide
assignment.
Given the statistical data, a plan that assigns students based solely on
location will not produce a diverse student body in Louisville or anywhere
else. Moreover, neighborhoods, which are constantly changing, do not
offer board members a reliable compass for determining the composition
of schools. Ideally, relying on student choice alone would result in school
populations that represent the district as a whole. In reality, however, absent
any district controls on choice, a personal-choice plan would be chaotic,
because it would encourage a "first come, first served" mentality. Such a
plan would also be unfair, because students with more involved parents
would be able to "gra[b] all of the goodies, i.e., educational opportunities,
that spawned years of litigation challenging educational and neighborhood discrimination.
This one-hour documentary "follows three families in Yonkers, New York, in the middle of a
confrontation about the politics and law of racial discrimination in housing and schools that
challenges and changes their hometown." About the Film, http://www.brick-by-brick.com/
about.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2008). Brick By Brick notes the close ties between segregation
and housing discrimination: "[tihe neighborhood school system reflected the city's sharp racial
divide." Since "[wihere you live defines what schools you'll have access to," the fact that
"White people in east Yonkers didn't want Blacks and Hispanics living in their neighborhoods
and going to their schools" made integration in the public schools extremely difficult. BRICK
By BRICK: A CIVIL RIGHTS STORY (Kavanagh Productions 2007).
167 Brief for Housing Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations, supra note 163,
at 1o.
168 U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Mobility: Population Characteristics, http://www.
census.gov/prod/zoo pubs/p2o-538.pdf (last visited July 14, 2008).
169 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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before others are able to access them."'170
A controlled-choice plan, on the other hand, encourages diverse student
bodies, because it creates a balance between freedom and constraint. A
controlled-choice plan allows students to select and rank the schools they
wish to attend. Individual choice is then moderated through a district's
enrollment guidelines. Permitting students to choose their schools "is a way
of freeing them from their group constraints,"'' such as race, socioeconomic
status, or residential location. On the other hand, constraint--enforced
through the use of enrollment guidelines-prevents one group from
accessing better educational opportunities than another.7 '
C. Diversity
The second integral component to the controlled-choice plan is
diversity. To implement a controlled-choice plan, a district must develop
its own guidelines based on needs unique to its community. As discussed
in Part III.B., such guidelines balance the choices that students have, by
preventing one group from accessing better educational opportunities than
another.
Race-neutral guidelines will fail to create a diverse student body. Thus,
although such guidelines are arguably a safer option after Parents Involved,
guidelines that eschew race entirely do not achieve the same effects as
districts that opt for race-conscious ones. For example, board members
in Wake County, North Carolina implemented a race-neutral student-
assignment plan. There, the district used two guideline criteria-student-
achievement factors and family income.'73 The Wake County plan set a
ceiling of 25 percent for low-achieving students and a ceiling of 40 percent
for lower-income children in each school. 17 4 Critics of the Wake County
plan have noted that "the plan provides a ceiling but not a floor for the
struggling students."'75 In other words, the practical result was that all-
Caucasian schools could meet the Wake County criteria, thus vitiating the
district's goal of diversity. Indeed, Wake County "has experienced a slight
decline in its racially balanced schools under [its] integration plan" 176 in spite
170 WILLIE ET. AL, supra note 151 , at 22.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Flinspach & Banks, supra note 3, at 26 1.
174 Id. at 270-71.
175 John Charles Boger, Brown and the American South: Fateful Choices, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 304, 321 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield
eds., 2005).
176 The Integration Report (Apr. 17, 2oo8), http://theintegrationreport.wordpress.
com/2oo8/04.
[Vol. 97
CONTROLLED-CHOICE
of the "high correlation between poverty and race in [the district]."'77
JCPC's plan to revise its original 15-50 percent guidelines is, on the
other hand, race conscious. First, the district has broadened its definition
of diversity to include all minorities, not just African Americans. Also, the
new guidelines consider a variety of factors, including race, income, and
educational attainment. These revised guidelines, which comply with
Justice Kennedy's opinion because they consider race generally alongside
other factors, create a balance between individual choice and fairness to
all students, regardless of their race or socioeconomic status. Students can
rank the schools they wish to attend, and if their first choice (School X)
has exceeded the enrollment guidelines, students will be assigned to their
second choice (School Y). So long as the decision to assign a particular
student to School Y instead of School X is not based "explicitly" 178 on that
student's race, such guidelines will be permissible under Parents Involved.
Diversity is an integral component to the controlled-choice plan, because
it creates more integrated schools. Race neutral guidelines, like the Wake
County plan, will not solve the problem of growing racial isolation in many
districts. Moreover, the consideration of race, alongside other factors, is
permissible under Parents Involved. Individual choice tempered by race-
conscious enrollment guidelines allows each student to have access to an
equal educational opportunity. The controlled-choice plan establishes a
balance between integration and personal choice, and it is this balance that
gives rise to diverse student bodies.
D. School Improvement
The least discussed and most crucial component of the controlled-
choice plan is school improvement. As demonstrated by the case law and
JCPS's recent publication of its new contiguous student-assignment plan,
public debate centers (almost exclusively) on how to assign students. In fact,
the bulk of this Note focuses on the means by which board members can
and cannot assign students post-Parents Involved. However, for a student-
assignment plan to succeed-to provide each student with an equal and
excellent education--each school itself must be competent and moving
toward excellence. Assigning students in a constitutional manner to poorly
performing schools will not solve the problem. Thus, the goal should be
not simply to assign students to a school, but to assign each student to a good
school of his or her choice.
177 Id. See also BRICK By BRICK, supra note 166. In Yonkers, statistical data showed that
the median income for African Americans and Caucasians was roughly equivalent. Thus, the
city's segregated neighborhoods and schools resulted, not from a simple disparity in income,
but something more-race. Id.
178 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007).
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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Many proponents of choice plans espouse an "economic ideology of
survival of the fittest." '7 9 As scholars have noted, this ideology fails to realize
that education is not made more valuable when it is scarce, as is the case in
a traditional supply-and-demand theory. Rather, "the more [good schools
there are] the better."'180 For this reason, a controlled-choice plan focuses
on improving the least-chosen schools. The struggling schools are easily
identified, since they are the schools that are least-chosen by students. In
other words, the plan acts as a kind of "referendum"'' on an individual
school's progress.
Once the least-chosen schools are determined, the process of school
improvement can begin. The means by which a school can improve are
varied (and deserving of greater discussion than this Note can provide),
but researchers have acknowledged "five basic characteristics of effective
schools""': "strong leadership by the principal, especially in instructional
matters[;] high expectations by teachers for student achievement[;] an
emphasis on teaching basic skills[;] a safe and orderly school environment
[and] frequent and systematic evaluation of student progress."'8 3 Whatever
specific plan a district adopts for school improvement, the goal should be
to "upgrade and make more attractive least-chosen schools."'" As schools
improve, students will have a broader range of schools from which to
choose. Eventually, every school will become an attractive school to a
diverse body of students. Arguably, this process will take many years, and
it will be costly. However, board members must commit to the difficult
task of improving the least-chosen schools, or a controlled-choice plan will
fail.
The benefits of a strong, diverse public-school system far outweigh the
costs, as John Dewey noted in his work, My Pedagogic Creed:
I believe that [school] is ... a social necessity because the home is the
form of social life in which the child has been nurtured and in connection
with which he has had his moral training. It is the business of the school to
deepen and extend his sense of the values bound up in his home life.
I believe that much of present education fails because it neglects this
fundamental principle of the school as a form of community life. It conceives
the school as a place where certain information is to be given, where certain
lessons are to be learned, or where certain habits are to be formed. The value
179 WILLIE ET. AL., supra note 151, at 24.
18o Id.
8 1 Id. at 23.
I82 Id. at 88.
183 Id. at 88. Seegenerally WILLIE ET. AL., supra note 15 I, for a more in-depth discussion of
the ways schools can improve.
184 Id. at 23.
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of these is conceived as lying largely in the remote future; the child must
do these things for the sake of something else he is to do; they are mere
preparation. As a result they do not become a part of the life experience of
the child and so are not truly educative.
I believe that the moral education centers upon this conception of the school
as a mode of social life, that the best and deepest moral training is precisely that
which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity
of work and thought. The present educational systems, so far as they destroy
or neglect this unity, render it difficult or impossible to get any genuine,
regular moral training.185
Written in 1897, these words should buoy the spirits of public-school board
members who, like John Dewey, have recognized the high social value of
providing an equal and excellent education to all students, regardless of the
practical difficulties involved in student assignment.'86
CONCLUSION
Public schools "constitute the greatest part of most students'
educational experience."' 187 While "the role of education in a democracy is
not to "reproduce family, community, class, and racial hierarchies," the goal
of public educators should be to "reduce these social constraints in favor of
equal opportunity and democracy."'' m In the words of Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr., "[a]s America pursues the important task of respecting the letter of
the law, i.e., compliance with desegregation decisions, she must be equally
concerned with the spirit of the law, i.e. commitment to the democratic
dream of integration."' 
89
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved illustrates that the
problem of racial isolation in JCPS (and across America) defies a trouble-
free solution. Just what type of voluntary student-assignment plan Justice
Kennedy would approve is still unclear. While each district's voluntary
student-assignment plan is unique, a controlled-choice plan is an effective
means to attack the problem of racial isolation. No voluntary student
assignment plan is perfect, and a controlled-choice plan will take time,
money, and hard work to develop. However, such a plan will best achieve
a publi-school district's goal to achieve an equal and excellent education
opportunity for each of its students, while at the same time ensuring
185 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, 54 Scn. J, 77, 77-80 (1897) (emphasis added), also
available at the Informal Education Archives, http://www.infed.orglarchives/e-texts/e-dew-
pc.htm.
186 See generally, BRICK By BalcK, supra note i66.
187 Powell, supra note 15o, at 284.
188 Id. at 281.
189 Id. at 297.
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compliance with Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved.
Student assignment will continue to play a fundamental role in
American education, given both the Supreme Court's desegregation
jurisprudence and the pressing problem of racial isolation in America's
public schools. Thus, to educate students in the "three R's-readin' and
'ritin' and 'rithmetic..." 10--board members should seek a controlled-choice
solution to the sometimes "intolerable" 19 problem of voluntary student-
assignment. Given the difficult reality of implementing any voluntary
student-assignment program, a controlled-choice plan is a responsible way
to assign students post-Parents Involved.
19o President Herbert Hoover, Address Commemorating the 2oth Anniversary of the
Boy Scouts of America (Mar. io, i93o), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=z2545.
191 Flinspach & Banks, supra note 3.
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